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Abstract: Recent debates about the organizational relationship
between Cyber Command and the NSA stress political issues over
force employment. This article focuses on the latter, making the
case that Cyber Command should be split from the NSA, because
nations that marshal and mobilize their cyber power and integrate
it into strategy and doctrine will ensure significant national security
advantage. Cyber Command provides the best route for developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary for achieving
these goals.

F

or twenty years, members of the United States’ national security
community, including readers of this journal, have debated the
potential tactical, operational, and strategic effects of cyber
components and capabilities.1 Recently, these discussions have become
intertwined with arguments about the organizational relationships
as well as the Title 10 (traditional military) and Title 50 (intelligence
and covert) authorities that exist under the Unified Command Plan.
Because of this expanding controversy, there is a growing chorus
calling for a split between the National Security Agency (NSA) and
US Cyber Command.
These debates are important. Yet they subsume the pivotal issue
—how cyber components and capabilities will affect US national security—beneath more transient legal and political issues generated in the
wake of Edward Snowden. Furthermore, past and current debates often
overlook a basic truth: battlefield outcomes and strategic effects are
the product of actual force employment, not theoretical arguments or
proving-ground tests.
Cyber Command should be cleaved from NSA, but not for reasons
of political expediency. Cyber Command should be split from NSA
because the United States needs an organizational arrangement that
provides for the development and normalization of Title 10 and Title
50 cyber capabilities, while maintaining a focus on how such will affect
the use of military force and US national security. Cyber Command
should be split from the NSA because nations that marshal and mobilize
their cyber power and integrate it into strategy and doctrine will ensure
significant national security advantage, and Cyber Command currently
provides the best route for achieving such.2
Cyber Command should be removed from under US Strategic
Command and established as a unified combatant command. That action
1     The debate began with John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative
Strategy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 141-165. The phrase “cyber components and capabilities” is used
to denote computer network attacks (CNA), computer network exploits (CNE), and computer network operations (CNO), as well as future developments both within and beyond these categories.
2     Frank J. Cilluffo and J. Richard Knop, “Getting Serious About Cyberwarfare,” The Journal of
International Security Affairs (New York: Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 2009).
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represents the most effective means for developing and maturing the
tactics, techniques, and procedures that will allow US cyber components
and capabilities to be employed for military purposes and to generate
strategic effects. Currently, there are two primary reasons why the establishment of a unified combatant command presents a better solution
than tasking existing branch and service structures. First, speed is of
the essence. Tasking an existing branch or service, or even establishing
a new service, would open up organizational and bureaucratic rivalries
likely to slow (if not cripple) the development of cyber components and
capabilities. Second, in the near term, Title 10 and Title 50 concerns,
vagueness in the cyber rules of engagement, concerns about political
blowback, and fears that US cyber weapons could be reverse engineered
and used against the United States, all highlight the importance of an
organizational solution that synchronizes and deconflicts activities
across the whole of government. In short, the United States needs a
combatant command that can do two things: (1) craft the tactical, operational, and strategic cyber capabilities US national security will need in
the decades to come; and, (2) oversee their application, integration, and
execution. Cyber Command is the best choice and now is the time to act.

Operationalizing Cyber

When Cyber Command was established in 2009, it made sense that
it be stood up as a sub-unified command under Strategic Command.
Until recently the line between computer network attacks and computer
network exploits was chiefly one of intent (i.e., if you had the ability
to exploit, you had the ability to attack). The use of cyber was largely
constrained to information collection and intelligence. Kinetic effects
and battlefield uses were essentially theoretical, not practical. In addition, because of the scarcity of manpower and materials, it made sense
that Cyber Command and the NSA be joined by the dual-hatting of their
commander, General Keith Alexander. This allowed the two organizations to pool resources and avoid redundancy.
Today, the situation is different. The kinetic potential of cyber components and capabilities have been demonstrated, attempts to employ
them for strategic effect have been undertaken. The use of cyber in
support of operational or strategic objectives is becoming increasingly
common. Three examples in a growing universe of cases illustrate this
point. The 2009 Stuxnet attack against Iran’s nuclear-fuel centrifuges
temporarily halted Tehran’s enrichment program. The 2011 distributed
denial of service attacks against government and media websites slowed
the counterconcentration of Georgian forces in response to Russia’s
military invasion.3 The 2012 distributed denial of service attacks against
American banks, launched in retaliation for the US-led sanctions against
Iran, exposed a weak point that potentially could be used to coerce the
US government.4
These cases suggest future conflicts will contain cyber elements at
both the operational and strategic levels. Such is the new reality. Regardless
of asymmetries in other capabilities, cyber components and capabilities
3     David Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008,” Small Wars Journal, January 6, 2011,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cyberwar-case-study-georgia-2008.
4     Richard Davies, “Iran Suspected in Bank Site Hacking,” ABC News, January 9, 2013, http://
abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2013/01/iran-suspected-in-bank-site-hacking/
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are now part of the battlefield and the strategic environment writ large.
At the same time, there are important differences between the use
of tactical and operational level cyber in conjunction with activities on
the physical domains, and strategic activities occurring solely within the
cyber domain itself. The result is a growing divergence between the missions of the NSA and Cyber Command—as well as a growing divergence
in the skills and capabilities each needs to fulfill its respective mission.
The increasing use of cyber at the operational and strategic levels
creates impetus for all military forces, from those of powerful nationstates to those of weak insurgent movements, to acquire cyber components
and capabilities. Cyber is not an instrument of the weak or the strong, it
is an instrument—period. It is becoming conventional wisdom that “the
ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in all
other operational environments and across the instruments of power”
will ensure significant advantage.5 America’s adversaries are preparing
for the operationalization of this conventional wisdom; the United States
must do so as well.
Still, the acquisition of new technologies is not enough. Stephen
Biddle argues that technology magnifies the effects of force employment.6 Technology makes capable forces more capable. If integrated
properly, technology enhances how military units execute or react to
actions born out of the principles of war: mass, maneuver, surprise,
security, simplicity, objective, offensive, economy of force, and unity of
command. Biddle warns, however, that technology is not a substitute
for good force employment. It will not make a “bad” force better.7 This
suggests that if cyber components and capabilities are to have actual
strategic effect, careful thought must be given to their application, integration, and execution. What is needed is an entity that can:
•• Think through these issues in regard to computer network attacks and
the defense of Department of Defense (DOD) systems.
•• Mature the cyber components themselves as well as the tactics, techniques, and procedures for their use.
•• Deconflict efforts across the whole of the US government.
Cyber Command represents the best entity for accomplishing all of
the above.
To allow Cyber Command to fulfill these roles, the Unified
Command Plan should be modified. Cyber Command should be
cleaved from the NSA, taken out from under Strategic Command, and
established as a functional combatant command. Cyber Command, like
US Special Operations Command, should receive direct Congressional
funding as a major force program, with the services free to make additional investments (as they do with Special Operations Command).8
Unlike Special Operations Command, Cyber Command should have
5     Franklin Framer, Stuart Starr, and Larry Wentz, Cyberpower and National Security (Washington,
DC: National Defense University, 2009); Cilluffo and Knop, “Getting Serious About Cyberwarfare.”
6     Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 146.
7     Ibid., 164.
8     Eric Olson, “The Future of Special Operations: Proposed Changes in the Unified Command
Plan,” Comments at the Global Security Forum (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2012).
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operational authority and the ability to initiate a request that forces be
attached to a geographic combatant command in response to identified
threats. In short, it is time to let Cyber Command come into its own.
At present Cyber Command exists, much as Special Operations
Command did in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, in the organizational
shadows unable to contribute its full potential to the security of the
United States. Establishing Cyber Command as a combatant command
would allow it to leverage its existing capabilities and organizational
relationships to develop US cyber capabilities through the fulfillment
of two missions. One mission would be to act as an incubator for
operational cyber capabilities. The other mission would be to act as the
designated operator for offensive actions within the cyber domain itself.
In its incubator role, Cyber Command should act as facilitator for the
development of cyber components and capabilities to enhance modern
force employment and integrate cyber components and capabilities into
the combined arms framework. In this role, Cyber Command should
work with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
the services’ various combat training directorates, academic programs,
and other private and public sector entities. Cyber Command would, as the
other combatant commands do, task the NSA for information and capabilities in support of its primary mission. The goal would be to develop,
demonstrate, and disseminate capabilities for cyber enhanced combat
operations on the terrain of the physical domains. Cyber Command
should act as a client and partner for activities such as DARPA’s Project
X, which seeks to map enemy networks, develop mission scripts for
the use of cyberweapons, and develop techniques for assessing battle
damage to cyber components and capabilities.9 Cyber Command should
act as a repository for lessons learned about the operational employment
of cyber and the lead for activities regarding how cyber components and
capabilities should be folded into the Joint Munitions Impact Modeling
System (JMIMs). Cyber Command would then be able to provide war
planners with more robust tools for understanding the likely effects of
cyber attacks, yielding as much confidence about the effects of computer
network attacks, as about the use of traditional munitions. Its incubator role would allow Cyber Command to refine tactics, techniques, and
procedures based on actual battlefield experiences—including those
from the use of cyber in Afghanistan—so that cyber is operationalized on the basis of combat experience rather than just theoretical or
proving-ground tests.10 In short, Cyber Command should be charged
with finding out how US forces could employ cyber to better execute
the principles of war within mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and
civilian (METT-TC) constraints.
In its operational role, Cyber Command should remain the entity
for operations that occur within the networks and systems that make
up cyberspace. In fact, Cyber Command ought be designated at the combatant command for the cyber domain. It should own all offensive or
defensive cyberborne operations not related to intelligence collection.
9     Tom Gjelten, “First Strike: US Cyber Warriors Seize the Offensive,” World Affairs (January/February
2013), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/first-strike-us-cyber-warriors-seize-offensive.
10     Sterling C. Beard, “Marine officer says US using cyberwarfare in Afghanistan,” The Hill
(Washington, DC: Capitol Hill Publishing Corporation, August 24, 2012), http://thehill.com/
blogs/defcon-hill/marine-corps/245421-marine-officer-says-us-using-cyberwarfare-in-afghanistan.
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Making one entity responsible for the use of components and capabilities in the cyber domain will protect American assets. It will ensure their
cautious use, reducing opportunities adversaries might have to copy
and reverse engineer them.11 Cyber Command should continue to field
cyberwarfare teams, like those General Alexander discussed before the
Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2013.12 Cyber Command,
through a sub-unified command within it, should play a role analogous
to the one Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) plays in regard
to counterterrorism. Once the intelligence community identifies a target
and the national command authority makes the decision to act, Cyber
Command should “pull the trigger.” To ensure accountability and
deconflict efforts across the whole of the US government, this process
should occur through a Title 10 and Title 50 synchronization process
similar to that of JSOC. Cyber Command should have responsibility
for this process, and then responsibility for implementing computer
network attacks. Cyber Command should continue to be responsible for
synchronizing and coordinating the actions of the service components:
US Army Cyber Command, the US 10th Fleet, the 24th Air Force, US
Marine Corps Force Cyber Command, and US Coast Guard Cyber
Command.13 This operational role, in addition to being vital in itself,
would support Cyber Command’s incubator mission through the constant development of new cyber components, capabilities, and skill sets.
Making the above happen requires a greater division of labor
between the NSA and Cyber Command. The use of cyber as an intelligence asset should be separated from the use of cyber as a military asset.
The NSA should continue to be responsible for and have authority to
execute cyberborne operations related to intelligence collection. More
specifically, the NSA should continue to be responsible for capturing
information from potential or existent US adversaries via computer
networks and operations; and support efforts to protect American
networks from similar attempts on the part of foreign governments,
criminal organizations, and others. In essence, this separation would
make Cyber Command responsible for Strategic Initiative 1 and the
NSA for Strategic Initiative 2, with each entity taking responsibility

11     Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, “Cyber Domain Conflict in the 21st Century,” The
Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 14, no. 1 (January 2013).
12     Richard Lardner, “US forming cyber teams to take offensive,” The Boston Globe, March 13,
2013. http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/03/12/pentagon-forming-cyber-teamsprevent-attacks/UcUxkq95wj2FCXTQ3LJsvM/story.html.
13     United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace
(Arlington, VA: United States Department of Defense), 5, http://www.defense.gov/news/
d20110714cyber.pdf.
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for the remaining three as outlined in the July 2011 “Department of
Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace”:
•• Strategic Initiative 1. “Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to
organize, train, and equip so that [DOD] can take full advantage of
cyberspace’s potential.”
•• Strategic Initiative 2. “Employ new defense operating concepts to protect
[DOD] networks and systems.”
•• Strategic Initiative 3. “Partner with other [US] government departments
and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government
cybersecurity strategy.”
•• Strategic Initiative 4. “Build robust relationships with [US] allies and
international partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity.”
•• Strategic Initiative 5. “Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation.”
This division would allow each entity to develop and refine the particular cyber techniques and skills most likely to bring about success within
their respective realms.
The need to separate Cyber Command from NSA, and to establish
it as a functional combatant command goes beyond force employment
or operations within the cyber domain onto itself. Cleaving Cyber
Command from NSA also addresses the need to balance (and rebalance)
Title 10 and Title 50 authorities. The convergence of traditional military
missions with intelligence and covert action is not new. General Edward
Meyer, Army Chief of Staff from 1979 to 1983, recognized the need for
such. General Meyer argued that America’s “adversaries were affecting
us below the threshold of war,” necessitating the development of new
capabilities. The result was the birth of special operations as a community that could blend combat capabilities, intelligence, and covert
action. In response to world events of the last three decades—including
the Iranian hostage crisis, the rise of Hezbollah and the bombing of
the Marine barracks in Beirut, and later al Qaeda and 9/11—this convergence of military, intelligence, and covert activities has continued.
Yet, in some areas, even when operationally necessary, convergence has
clouded authorities. It has made it unclear as to which parts of the government are responsible and accountable for various actions. Given how
they permeate modern life, cyber components and capabilities raise new
issues. Cyber adds concerns about privacy to those about force employment and intelligence. Separating Cyber Command from NSA would
support the synchronization of Title 10 and Title 50, where necessary,
and alleviate privacy concerns by clarifying the authorities for conducting various cyber operations within specific contexts.14
Three additional issues must be resolved to establish Cyber Command
as a functional combatant command charged with maturing the US
cyber capabilities and executing operations within the cyber domain.
14     Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of Title 10/Title 50 Debate.”
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series Number 212, (Austin, TX: The University of Texas
School of Law, October 17, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945392; Andru Wall, “Demystifying
the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert
Action.” Harvard National Security Journal 3, no. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2011), http://
harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol.-3_Wall1.pdf.
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First, Cyber Command must have budgetary independence to ensure its
needs are not squeezed out by bureaucratic competition with the service
components, other combatant commands, or weapons systems. For this
reason, Cyber Command should receive direct funding from Congress
as a major force program. The other services should be free to make
investments in Cyber Command, but the command must have a budget
insulated from the concerns or needs of the services themselves, the
other combatant commands, or the DOD itself. Second, unlike Special
Operations Command, Cyber Command must be granted the ability
to initiate a request that specific cyber components and capabilities be
attached to geographic combatant commands in response to identified
threats. Because of the unique nature of Cyber Command’s expertise,
especially in the near term, the command is likely to possess greater
understanding of the cyber threats and opportunities faced by other
combatant commands. The fulfillment of such requests should require
input from the receiving command before being decided by the national
command authority. Third, Congress and the executive branch must
make significant investments in the personnel needs of both NSA and
Cyber Command. The size of the cyber work force should be increased,
and training of individuals tailored to the missions and requirements
of their respective command. It is imperative that Congress and the
executive branch supply the resources necessary to accomplish this. The
United States must avoid a situation in which Cyber Command and the
NSA are left operationally anemic by a lack of qualified personnel and a
need to compete with one another for the highly skilled individuals each
needs to fulfill their respective missions.
Today, there are three broad reasons to undertake the above proposal. First, it would facilitate the integration of cyber components and
capabilities into the combined arms framework, and provide an effective
mechanism for the crafting of cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Second, it represents the most efficient, and most likely, path for achieving the strategic initiatives outlined in the 2011 Department of Defense
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.15 Third, it keeps cybersecurity
discussions, policy, and practice focused on the fact that the central
issues—even in regard to the potential for cyberwarfare—are inherently
about grand strategy and human conflict, not technical capability.
To be clear, the establishment of Cyber Command as a functional
combatant command does not represent a panacea. It leaves unaddressed important issues regarding the security of the US private sector
cyber assets and resources, including jurisdictional issues among the
NSA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. It also leaves unaddressed important issues about the
rights and responsibilities of the US private sector regarding the ability
to engage in the active defense of their computer networks and systems
from the efforts of organized crime, foreign attacks, and state-sponsored espionage. Still, doing so represents the best means (at present)
for developing and normalizing Title 10 and Title 50 cyber capabilities
for offensive action and in defense of DOD computer networks and
systems. It also represents the logical mechanism for attempting to

15     Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.
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achieve the Presidential Policy Directive-20 goal of using cyber to dissuade, deter, or compel US adversaries.16

Conclusion

It is critically important that the United States act now to integrate
cyber fully into operational level force employment. Evidence suggests
America’s adversaries are doing just that. Given America’s greater reliance
on cyber, and thus greater vulnerability, US national security necessitates
it maintain a dominant position in regard to cyber. Dominance comes
through application, integration, and execution. At this point, the United
States needs to designate one entity to take lead in the development and
maturing of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that will allow cyber
components and capabilities to be employed for military purposes, establish dominance, and generate strategic effects. For these reasons, it is
time to establish Cyber Command as a functional combatant command.
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